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A B S T R A C T
Background
The recent spread of avian influenza in wild birds and poultry may be a precursor to the
emergence of a 1918-like human pandemic. Therefore, stockpiles of human pre-pandemic
vaccine (targeted at avian strains) are being considered. For many countries, the principal
constraint for these vaccine stockpiles will be the total mass of antigen maintained. We tested
the hypothesis that lower individual doses (i.e., less than the recommended dose for maximum
protection) may provide substantial extra community-level benefits because they would permit
wider vaccine coverage for a given total size of antigen stockpile.
Methods and Findings
We used a mathematical model to predict infection attack rates under different policies. The
model incorporated both an individual’s response to vaccination at different doses and the
process of person-to-person transmission of pandemic influenza. We found that substantial
reductions in the attack rate are likely if vaccines are given to more people at lower doses.
These results are applicable to all three vaccine candidates for which data are available. As a
guide to the magnitude of the effect, we simulated epidemics based on historical studies of
immunogenicity. For example, for one of the vaccines for which data are available, the attack
rate would drop from 67.6% to 58.7% if 160 out of the total US population of 300 million were
given an optimal dose rather than 20 out of 300 million given the maximally protective dose (as
promulgated in the US National Pandemic Preparedness Plan). Our results are conservative with
respect to a number of alternative assumptions about the precise nature of vaccine protection.
We also considered a model variant that includes a single high-risk subgroup representing
children. For smaller stockpile sizes that allow vaccine to be offered only to the high-risk group
at the optimal dose, the predicted benefits of using the homogenous model formed a lower
bound in the presence of a risk group, even when the high-risk group was twice as infective
and twice as susceptible.
Conclusions
In addition to individual-level protection (i.e., vaccine efficacy), the population-level
implications of pre-pandemic vaccine programs should be considered when deciding on
stockpile size and dose. Our results suggest that a lower vaccine dose may be justified in order to
increase population coverage, thereby reducing the infection attack rate overall.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Introduction
The recent spread of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) in wild birds and poultry may be a precursor
to the emergence of a 1918-like human pandemic [1,2].
Therefore, stockpiles of human pre-pandemic vaccine (tar-
geted at avian HPAI strains) are being considered by many
countries. For example, the US intends to provide enough pre-
pandemic vaccine to protect 20 million people [3]. Data from
Phase II clinical trials are available for three candidate
vaccines [4–6]. Two of the candidates are adjuvant inactivated
whole-virion vaccines for which immunological responses for
doses in the ranges 1.25–10 lg [5] and 7.5–30 lg [4] have been
reported. The third candidate is a nonadjuvant inactivated
split-virion vaccine [6] for which immunological responses for
doses in the range 7.5–90 lg have been reported. All three
trials found that during haemagglutinin inhibition (HI) tests,
sera from at least 50% of individuals who received two
inoculations at the maximum dose were able to neutralize
target antigens at concentrations of 1:40. It should be noted
that pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles would most likely be
used as part of a globally reactive strategy; i.e., countries would
plan to initiate vaccination programs when a nascent
pandemic is confirmed in a remote region, rather than
routinely vaccinating against avian strains. However, it would
not be possible to use vaccines in a truly reactive way, i.e.,
vaccinating contacts of individual cases, because the time lag
between vaccination and protection is long compared with the
likely speed of progression of individual national epidemics.
The current annual global production capacity is 350
million doses of trivalent influenza vaccine [7]. If pre-
pandemic vaccine stockpiles are implemented, they will need
to be replenished periodically because of strain drift in HPAI
[8]. In addition, capacity will need to be shared with vaccines
against seasonal influenza. Therefore, even if global capacity
is increased substantially, say to 780 million doses by 2009 as
proposed by the World Health Organization [7], it remains
unlikely that sufficient pre-pandemic vaccine antigen will
ever be available for many populations to allow universal
coverage at the maximally protective doses reported for
current candidates.
This excess demand for pandemic vaccination has stimu-
lated a vigorous debate over appropriate goals for vaccine
allocation strategies. Some have argued that the distribution
of vaccines should be designed to directly protect those most
at risk of mortality or severe morbidity [9], while others have
indicated that vaccination of those groups who are most
infectious should be prioritized as this will have substantial
indirect effects [10]. A recent comparison [11] of these two
approaches suggests that the latter (transmission-limiting
strategies) would be more successful for moderate- or low-
transmission pandemic strains, whereas the former (morbid-
ity-limiting strategies) would be more effective for higher-
transmissibility strains.
Here, we investigate a parallel issue that policy makers
should consider before deciding on pandemic vaccine
allocation strategies. We suggest that for many large pop-
ulations, the principal constraint for pre-pandemic influenza
vaccine stockpiles will be the total mass of antigen maintained.
In this article, we predict the pandemic influenza attack rate
for different dosing strategies under this constraint using a
mathematical model that incorporates both an individual’s
response to vaccination and the process of person-to-person
transmission. We investigate the hypothesis that lower
individual doses, conferring less than maximal protection
for those vaccinated, may provide substantial incremental
community-level benefit because they would permit wider
vaccine coverage for a given size of antigen stockpile.
Methods
Simple Illustrative Model
The main concepts of our approach can best be under-
stood using a simplified model of immune response. For this
simple model, we assumed that the action of an influenza
vaccine was all-or-nothing [12], i.e., it conferred complete
protection on a proportion pv of those who received it but
gave no protection to the remaining 1  pv. We defined c as
the proportion of the population that received the vaccine
and f(d) to be the dose-response function, such that pv ¼ f(x)
was the probability of complete protection after vaccination
where dose x was one of the doses tested during the clinical
trial. Because the only action of this vaccination program was
to completely protect a proportion cpv of the population, it
must have been optimally effective when cpv was maximized.
It is straightforward to show that this occurs when f(x)/x is
maximized. Note that this optimality condition is independ-
ent of transmissibility of the pathogen. The function f(x)/x is
the gradient of a straight line from the origin to a point on
the dose-response curve y ¼ f(x).
The basic reproductive number R0 is a measure of the
transmissibility of a pathogen and is defined as the average
number of infections generated by a typically infectious
individual in an otherwise susceptible population.We assumed
mass-action-like mixing and that all individuals had similar
infectiousness profiles. Therefore, for this simple model of
vaccine effect, the infection attack rate awas defined by a single
characteristic equation for the product of the initial propor-
tion susceptible and the overall probability of infection,
a ¼ ð1 pvcÞð1 eR0aÞ: ð1Þ
This equation predicts that in the absence of vaccination,
for a pandemic strain with R0¼1.8, the infection attack rate a
¼73%. After two doses with 10 lg of the vaccine described by
Lin et al. [6], 78% of HI titres reached 1:40 or greater.
Conservatively, if we assume that 50% of individuals with HI
titres of 1:40 or greater are protected [13], this implies that
39% of individuals were protected. Similarly, after two doses
with 2.5 lg—at which f(x)/x is maximized – 14.5% of individuals
receiving the vaccine were protected. Therefore, under this
simple model, if 20 out of 300 million people in the US were
vaccinated with two 10 lg doses, 20/3003 39%¼ 2.6% of the
population would be completely protected and the attack rate
a would drop from 73.2% to 69.5% for R0¼1.8,whereas if the
same total amount of antigen were used to vaccinate 80 out of
300 million with two 2.5 lg doses, 80/3003 14.5%¼ 3.8% of
the population would be completely protected and the attack
rate a would drop to 67.7% (note that these numerical
examples are for illustrative purposes only).
Model Used for Quantitative Results
However, results from this simple model substantially
underestimate the community-level effect of partial coverage
vaccination programs, because the model does not capture
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the full range of possible immune responses. In order to more
accurately assess the impact of vaccination, we refined the
simple model to include a continuous range of possible
vaccine doses and multiple immune states for post-vaccina-
tion individuals. For each candidate vaccine we defined: the
ordered set of all doses tested during the clinical trial, x ¼
fx1,. . .,xj,. . .,xmg; the continuous dose d between the lowest (x1)
and highest (xm) doses tested; and the set of all immune classes
(defined by HI titre) used in the clinical trial, h ¼
fh1,. . .,hj,. . .,hng. The probability mass pT(hi;xj) was the proba-
bility that vaccination with one of the trial doses xj induced
immune state hi. Values for pT(hi;xj) were assumed to be equal
to the proportion of trial participants observed in each
immune class. Similarly, the probability mass p(hi;d) was
defined as the probability that vaccination with dose d (drawn
from a continuous scale) induced immune state hi. Values for
p(hi;d) were obtained by logarithmic interpolation in the d
dimension between the largest member of x smaller than d
and the smallest member of x larger than d.
The susceptibility of all those in hi, the ith immune state,
was reduced by a factor zi (i.e., zi ¼ 0 was fully susceptible)
according to the attack rates observed during deliberate
infection experiments with the post-1968 HK strain of H3N2
influenza A (Table S1) [14]. Individuals were assumed to have
been infected if there was a 4-fold or greater increase in
serum HI titre 2 or 3 wk after the challenge, or if virus could
be cultured from nasal swabs taken 48 h after the infectious
challenge. For each of these experiments, we used the class
with the highest attack rate as the baseline for susceptibility,
effectively imposing the constraint that the relation between
HI titre and protection is a monotonically decreasing
function. Therefore, for the pre-1968 strain [14], we used
the infection rate of the 1:6 group as the baseline for
susceptibility. Although, qualitatively, our results are not
sensitive to this assumption, it does affect the relative
protective effect of the lower antibody classes and therefore
reduces the estimated benefits of lower-dose policies (Figure
S1; Table S1). The relative susceptibility of the ith class was
equal to the attack rate observed in that class divided by that
observed in the baseline class. For example, for the pre-1968
strain, 41.9% of volunteers in the fourth HI titre class (1:24)
were infected during the experiment, compared with 74.3%
of volunteers in the 1:6 HI titre class. Therefore, z4¼ 1 41.9/
74.3 ¼ 0.44. Because different HI titre classes were used for
each vaccine trial and for the deliberate infection experi-
ment, we used logarithmic interpolation to generate a
continuous function for zi values.
By assuming that all those in the same immune state had
their susceptibility reduced by a factor zi, immunity in this
version of the model could be described as ‘‘leaky’’ (as
opposed to all-or-nothing [12]), because no individual was
fully protected. We also used a model variant in which a
proportion zi of those in the ith immune class were assumed
to be completely protected while the rest were not (this
variant is referred to below as ‘‘all-or-nothing within immune
classes’’). We define p(zi;d) as the probability that vaccination
at dose d puts individuals into an immune state with average
reduction in susceptibility zi. The function p(zi;d) is shown
graphically for the three candidate vaccines in Figure 1. We
were also interested in the expected reduction in suscepti-
bility for a given dose, which we define to be
hzi ¼
X
all i
zipðzi; dÞ: ð2Þ
This function summarizes the combined effect of a vaccine
altering the immune state of an individual and of the
protective effects of different immune states.
We then calculated the infection attack rate under this
refined individual model in a population of well-mixed risk
Figure 1. Individual-Level Vaccine Response for Three Vaccine Candi-
dates
Vaccine candidates were those reported by (A) Treanor et al. [6] (on day
56 after the initial dose), (B) Bresson et al. [4] (day 42, with alum) and (C)
Lin et al. [5] (day 42). The legends show the range of doses included in
the clinical trial for each vaccine. The y-axis shows the reverse cumulative
proportion of participants with HI titres (x-axis). Each titre level
constitutes an immune state hi. We assume that pT(hi ;xj) is equal to
the logarithmic interpolation between the discrete doses (see main text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040218.g001
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groups. We let xij be the proportion of a population in
immune state i and risk group j after a vaccination program
with coverage cj in risk group j. The first immune class of a
given risk group, in which there was no protection against the
pandemic strain, contained those who had not received
vaccination and those for which it had had no effect x1j¼1 cj
þ cjp. The proportion of the overall population in the other
immune states, i . 1, was xij ¼ cjpi. We considered only
scenarios with two risk groups, one high and one low. The
high-risk group was 1þa times as infectious and 1þ e times as
susceptible, but the two groups mixed freely. Therefore, the
infection matrix between these risk groups was
m ¼ 1 1þ a
1þ e ð1þ eÞð1þ aÞ
 
: ð3Þ
Thus, our equation for the infection attack rate could be
modified for each risk group j to include contributions from
individuals in each of the different post-vaccination immune
states in each of the two risk groups,
aj ¼
X
all i
xji 1 e

X
all k
bmjkakð1 ziÞ
8<
:
9=
;; ð4Þ
where aj was the infection attack rate of the jth risk group and
mjk was an element ofm. In the homogeneous case, with only a
single risk group, a¼ 0, e¼ 0, mij¼ 1; b was equal to the basic
reproductive number for themodel. In theheterogeneous case,
with at least one of a. 0 or e. 0, the value of b was chosen to
give an overall attack rate of 73% in the absence of vaccination
(the attack rate in the homogeneous case when R0¼1.8).
The structure described above constitutes our base case
model. We tested the sensitivity of our results with the
homogeneous model to assumptions concerning the refer-
ence data for the protection associated with immune states
(i.e., 1968 HK strain of H3N2 influenza A [14]) and to the
assumption of leaky versus all-or-nothing immunity within
immune states. Note that we use infection as our outcome
measure for this study; we do not address the relationship
between infection and either morbidity or mortality.
Results
Initially, we considered a homogeneous population without
different risk groups. For all three vaccine candidates [4–6],
increasing the population coverage by lowering the dose led
to substantially lower infection attack rates (see Figure 2A–
2C). However, the specific shape of the response curves for
the different vaccines (Figure 1) influenced the expected
degree of reduction for a given change in dose. For example,
halving the dose from the maximum (therefore doubling the
coverage) had a large impact on the infection attack rate for
the vaccine reported by Treanor et al. [6] (hereafter, the
Treanor vaccine), a less substantial effect for the vaccine
reported by Lin et al. [5] (Lin vaccine), and very little change
for the vaccine reported by Bresson et al. [4] (Bresson
vaccine). If the optimal dose gave an attack rate within 1% of
that of the minimum dose, we set the optimal dose to be the
minimum. Under this criterion, for stockpile sizes too small
to provide a minimum dose for all, the optimal dose for all
three vaccine candidates (black lines, Figure 2A–2C) was
equal to the minimum dose tested. For these small stockpiles,
optimal coverage was less than 100% (green lines, Figure 2D–
2F). For larger stockpile sizes, the optimal dose corresponded
to an equal division of antigen among all members of the
population.
We tested the sensitivity of our results to alternative
assumptions about the protective effect of different HI titres,
to the choice between leaky or all-or-nothing response types
within an immune state and to the possible reservation of a
portion of the stockpile to provide maximum individual
protection to health care workers (Table 1). For illustrative
purposes, we described these sensitivities using the predicted
difference in attack rate if the optimal dose was used rather
than the maximally protective dose, for stockpiles of antigen
sufficient to vaccinate 20 out of 300 million Americans with
the maximally protective dose (see above and [3]). For the Lin
vaccine, under the baseline model the predicted attack rate
dropped from 67.6% to 58.7%, giving an absolute reduction
in attack rate of 8.9%. This relatively large reduction,
compared with a drop of 1.8% under the simple model (see
Methods), demonstrates the importance of including more
realistic assumptions about the nature of individual immune
responses to vaccination. When we recalibrated the baseline
model using deliberate infection data from a second H3
strain [14] and field data [15], even larger drops in the attack
rate were observed. Similarly, if we assumed an all-or-nothing
response type within immune states, the benefits associated
with an optimal dose also increased. In this sense, the results
presented in Figure 2 are conservative with respect to
Figure 2. Impact of Alternative Dosing Strategies for the Three Vaccines
Vaccines candidates were those reported by (A, D) Treanor et al. [6]; (B, E)
Bresson et al. [4]; and (C, F) Lin et al. [5].
(A–C) Infection attack rate a (colour as per legend) for different dosing
strategies (y-axes) and different stockpile sizes (antigen per capita, x-
axes). The solid black line shows the optimal dosing strategy at which
the infection attack rate is minimized. Note that where the thick black
line is not horizontal; it corresponds to (antigen per capita)¼ 23 (dose).
This is because each individual requires two doses of vaccine.
(D–F) Illustration of the relationship between optimal coverage
(proportion of population receiving vaccine, green lines, right y-axes)
and optimal dose (blue lines, left y-axes) for different stockpile sizes
(antigen per capita, x-axes).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040218.g002
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alternative assumptions about the protective effect of differ-
ent HI titres and to our choice between leaky or all-or-
nothing response types within an immune state.
Next, we assumed that the maximum dose was offered to 9
million health care workers (out of a population of 300
million in the United States [16]), while a different dose was
optimized from the remaining stockpile in order to reduce
the attack rate (Table 1). We assumed that health care workers
were equally as infectious and susceptible as the rest of the
population (see Discussion). As might be expected, the
allocation of 45% of the stockpile to an inefficient maximum
dose led to a reduction approximately by a factor of 2 in the
estimated benefits of the overall vaccination program. Note
that we focus on the US because it is the first country to
publicly commit to a stockpile that will not be nationally
universal. In contrast, Switzerland has committed to purchas-
ing 8 million doses of pre-pandemic vaccine, which will be
sufficient to cover its entire population [17].
Up to this point, we assumed that all individuals were
equally susceptible and infectious. However, if it is possible to
target vaccination programs on the basis of transmission risk
groups, as would be the case for a children-first policy, then
the correlation between population subgroup and interven-
tion must be reflected in the model structure. Therefore, in
order to consider the impact of the optimal vaccination
policies in heterogeneous populations, we returned to the
baseline model described above (leaky immunity, conserva-
tive relationship between HI titre and protection, and no
special provision for health care workers) but allowed a single
high-risk subgroup of the population to be more susceptible
or more infectious or both. This subgroup represented
children and was set to be 24.5% of the population, which
is the current proportion of the US population under 18 y of
age [18]. Children were given priority when there was
insufficient vaccine to cover the whole population, and were
assumed to have a relative susceptibility of (1 þ a) and a
relative infectivity of (1 þ e). Figure 3 (blue dots) shows the
performance of the optimal policy (calculated assuming that
the population was homogeneous, i.e., as shown in Figure 2)
for all three vaccines, for different stockpile sizes, with both a
and e allowed to vary randomly between 0 and 1. This model
structure was equivalent to assuming that children could be,
on average, up to twice as infectious and twice as susceptible
which is consistent with recent estimates [19].
The inclusion of a high-risk group had different effects for
stockpiles of different sizes. For smaller stockpiles, when the
optimal dose could only be offered within the high-risk
group, the presence of the high-risk group increased the
benefits of using the optimal dose instead of the maximum
dose. This might have been expected, given that we kept the
attack rate constant after adding the high-risk group, thus
forcing a higher proportion of infections to originate from
individuals in the high-risk group than in the rest of the
population. Therefore, preventing a given number of
infections in the high-risk group (when one existed) had
more of an effect than preventing the same number of
infections in a homogeneous population.
For larger stockpile sizes, the presence of the high-risk group
tended to reduce the benefits associated with the use of an
optimal dose compared with a maximum dose. For the
Treanor vaccine and for all but the largest stockpile sizes for
the Lin vaccine, the lower bounds of those decreased benefits
Table 1. Sensitivity Analyses
Vaccine Protection Data Used
to Calibrate Modela
Response Type within
Immune Statesb
D Attack Ratec
Single Uniform Dose Two-Tiered Dosingd
(HCW plus Optimized Dose)
Treanor [6] HK strain [14] Leaky 8.2% 4.4%
All-or-nothing 10.0% 5.4%
Pre-1968 strain [14] Leaky 6.5% 3.5%
All-or-nothing 8.4% 4.6%
Field data [15] Leaky 9.5% 5.1%
All-or-nothing 11.0% 6.0%
Bresson [4] HK strain [14] Leaky 2.5% 1.4%
All-or-nothing 3.2% 1.8%
Pre-1968 strain [14] Leaky 2.3% 1.2%
All-or-nothing 3.0% 1.6%
Field data [15] Leaky 3.5% 1.9%
All-or-nothing 4.2% 2.3%
Lin [5] HK strain [14] Leaky 8.9% 4.8%
All-or-nothing 11.6% 6.3%
Pre-1968 strain [14] Leaky 9.0% 4.8%
All-or-nothing 11.8% 6.4%
Field data [15] Leaky 16.7% 8.8%
All-or-nothing 19.2% 10.4%
aApparent reduction in susceptibility from either deliberate infection experiments [14] or field studies [15].
bWithin the immune states (see main text), for leaky responses, all individuals in the same immune state have their susceptibility reduced by the same amount. For the all-or-nothing
responses, a proportion of individuals are protected completely, while the rest receive no protection.
cPredicted reduction in infection attack rate if the optimal dose is used rather than the maximum dose, for a total stockpile size that would allow the protection of 20 out of 300 million at
the maximum dose [3]. The reduction is absolute, not relative; i.e., a change of attack rate from 73% to 63% is a 10% change in attack rate. Note that these results were generated using
the homogeneous model.
dAssuming that 9 million health care workers (HCW) [16] out of 300 million receive the maximum tested dose while a different dose is optimized from the remaining stockpile.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040218.t001
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were still substantial improvements over the maximum-dose
strategy for moderate stockpile sizes. However, for the Bresson
vaccine, for stockpiles large enough to offer theminimumdose
to the entire population, a substantial proportion of the
parameter sets tested in our sensitivity analysis resulted in
higher attack rates for the optimal dose (calculated using the
homogeneous model) over the maximum dose.
In practice, there may be a lower bound on the level of
individual protection that people will accept from a vaccine,
even during a pandemic. Individual protective effects of
different doses of candidate vaccines can be summarized by
hzi, the expected reduction in susceptibility (see Figure 4).
Values for hzi varied between 0.1 and 0.6 across different
doses for the three candidate vaccines. This quantity
describes the anticipated level of individual protection per
infectious challenge for those who receive vaccinations. It is
of the same dimension as parameters used elsewhere to
describe the reduction in susceptibility for individuals
receiving prophylactic antiviral drugs (e.g., h or 1/AVES in
[20]), but it is not a measure of the reduced risk of infection
over a typical inter-pandemic influenza season: it does not
specify how individuals respond to multiple infectious
challenges. Any decision to increase coverage by reducing
the vaccine dose implies a reduction in hzi, with large
reductions potentially unacceptable to vaccinees. With this
potential restriction on vaccination policies in mind, we
repeated the risk group analyses for all three candidate
vaccines with a lower bound of hzi ¼ 0.4 (red dots, Figure 3).
Because the marginal return in protection for all three
vaccines is highest at low doses, the imposition of this lower
bound for an individual level of protection substantially
reduced the community-level benefits of vaccination.
Discussion
For a stockpile of pandemic influenza vaccine that is
constrained by total mass of antigen, we have shown that for
the three candidates for which data are available [4–6], wider
coverage at lower doses would likely result in substantially
lower infection attack rates. A reduction in attack rate of
8.9% (see Table 1) in a population the size of the US (300
million) corresponds to 27 million fewer influenza infections
in a period of less than a year. Even if 45% of the stockpile
were reserved to be used at maximum dose for health care
workers, a reduction in attack rate of 4.8% implies that 14
million infections could be averted. Although these results
are sensitive to some uncertainties (see below), the general
Figure 3. Sensitivity of Predicted Reduction in Attack Rate to the Inclusion
of a High-Risk Group Representing Children for Three Vaccine Candidates
(A) Treanor et al. [6].
(B) Bresson et al. [4].
(C) Lin et al. [5].
The underlying level of transmission b was calculated so as to maintain
the same attack rate as the homogeneous model with R0¼ 1.8, i.e., 73%.
The blue lines and dots on the chart describe results for optimal policies,
with doses at or very close to the minimum tested range, as calculated
using the homogeneous model. The red lines and dots describe results
for a restricted policy, i.e., the dose used had to be large enough to
provide an expected reduction in the susceptibility of an individual of hzi
¼ 0.4 (see Figure 4). Solid lines (not perfectly vertical) show the predicted
reduction in infection attack rate for the homogeneous model, i.e.,
relative infectivity a¼ 0 and relative susceptibility e¼ 0. The dashed lines
show the benefit of the two different policies with relative infectivity of
the risk group twice that of the rest of the population, i.e., a ¼ 1, and
relative susceptibility twice that of the rest of the population, i.e., e¼ 1.
Dots show the results from 1,000 Latin-hypercube samples [27] over the
linear range for a and e, and the log range of the x-axes for stockpile size.
The red and blue vertical lines show the stockpile size at which complete
coverage of the high-risk group is first achieved. The vertical black line
shows the smallest stockpile size at which the whole population can be
offered the optimal dose.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040218.g003
Figure 4. Expected Reduction in Susceptibility after Vaccination hzi for
the Three Vaccines
Vaccine candidates were those reported by Treanor et al. [6] (red);
Bresson et al. [4] (blue); and Lin et al. [5] (green). For comparison, the dose
(x-axis) is given as a proportion of the maximum dose used in the clinical
trial. The range of doses used for each vaccine is indicated in the legend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040218.g004
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pattern of lower doses being substantially more efficient at
the population level is consistent across all three vaccines
candidates and over a number of alternatives for key
assumptions (Table 1).
By its very nature, a stockpile of pre-pandemic vaccine that
is manufactured prior to the widespread transmission of a
novel influenza strain represents a substantial gamble on the
part of health policy makers. Therefore, in light of our results,
we suggest that countries currently planning such programs
immediately investigate the manufacturing and logistical
implications of lower-dose, higher-coverage programs. If
these downstream logistical constraints can be overcome,
lower-dose vaccination programs will help to spread the risk
of this resource-intensive public health policy by increasing
the number of individuals who may benefit while reducing
the expected infection attack rate. However, further empiri-
cal studies are required before final decisions with respect to
pre-pandemic vaccines in general are made.
The results presented here depend two key assumptions.
The first is that a logarithmic interpolation of clinical trial
data at a few discrete doses gives an accurate description of
the biological effect of vaccines across a continuous range of
doses. This biological effect is measured by the expected
distribution of homologous HI titres in naı¨ve individuals
following vaccination with a given dose. Data from clinical
trials with greater resolution at low doses could rapidly
address this uncertainty.
The second key assumption is more problematic and has
implications beyond the planning of pre-pandemic vaccina-
tion programs. For our baseline results, we have assumed that
the individual protection implied by the homologous avian H5
titre against the eventual pandemic strain is the same as that
implied by the homologous human H3 titres of 345 volunteers
who subsequently received a single experimental infectious
challenge with a strain containing the same H3 protein [14].
We used these data for our baseline because of the large
sample size and because the resulting estimates of reduction in
attack rate were conservative compared with the use of
alternative datasets (see Table 1). Also, these data appear to be
the main source for the widely quoted HI titre protection
threshold of 1:40. However, this apparently frail assumption
(which implicitly motivates many empirical studies of influ-
enza vaccines; see also Figure S1) highlights the urgent need
for deliberate infection studies using currently circulating
human influenza strains and current vaccines. These studies
should include non-homologous serological testing in addi-
tion to multiple infectious challenges. The latter will provide
data with which to address the issue of all-or-nothing versus
leaky immunity. Also, if it is possible to validate animal models
of influenza vaccination and protection with current human
strains, such systems could be of considerable use in evaluating
the likely efficacy of human H5 vaccines.
In this study, we have investigated the impact of the
principal individual-level effects of vaccination on the general
population. These effects can be quantified directly using
either standard clinical trial protocols or, to some extent,
simple deliberate infection experiments on isolated individ-
uals. However, a number of secondary individual-level effects
could have an impact on our findings but would be more
difficult to measure directly. For example, vaccination will
likely affect infectivity as well as susceptibility. Also, the
elderly and the immunosuppressed may respond less well to
vaccination. Although it is not clear how these variations
would affect the benefits of lower-dose strategies, they would
be difficult to measure because of the ethical considerations of
recruiting the elderly and the immunosuppressed into vaccine
trials. It may be that a single dose of pandemic vaccine can be
effective in priming the immune system such that an actual
infectious challenge generates a final protective response [21].
Also, novel adjuvants currently under development may be
able to increase the immunogenicity of lower dose vaccina-
tions and of cross protection between different viral clades
[21]. However, here we restricted ourselves to making the best
use of currently available data. Further analyses of the
population level effects of both priming and novel adjuvants
would need to be supported by strong empirical evidence.
The simple illustrative model, with all individuals in the
population assumed to be either fully susceptible or fully
immune, serves to illustrate the fundamental benefit of lower-
dose strategies. Under this model, the dose-response curve f(d)
is concave for all three candidate vaccines. Therefore, the
quantity f(d)/d is maximized at a dose lower than the
maximum, which suggests that concavity ensures that lower
doses are the most efficient way to generate immune
individuals. This observation motivates more detailed clinical
trials of pre-pandemic vaccines. Although results are con-
sistent for different candidate vaccines, trial data give only
sparse coverage at lower doses. Also, the concept of concavity
for the full model, with multiple immune states and leaky
immunity, requires further theoretical investigation.
Although use of vaccine doses that give less than the
maximum demonstrated protection at the individual level
may present some ethical issues, they may not be as
challenging as first thought. Currently, to be licensed in
Europe, candidate vaccines against influenza must be able to
neutralize antigens at serum concentrations of 1:40 (in HI
tests) in at least 70% of individuals [22]. Draft guidelines from
the US Federal Drug Administration propose that the lower
bound of the 95% confidence interval for vaccine efficacy
should be between 40% and 45% [23]. Typically, vaccine trials
conducted for licensing purposes are designed so that the
maximum dose tested just passes these hurdles. It is likely that
if current seasonal influenza vaccines were tested at higher
doses, they could protect a greater proportion of vaccinees
without significant increases in toxicity. Therefore, to some
extent, commercial pressures and the current licensing
process promote the development of less-than-maximally-
protective vaccines. As long as the individual-level protection
of a community-optimized pandemic vaccine is clearly
described, it could be argued that there is no substantive
ethical difference between recommending the use of such a
vaccine and recommending the use of a typical vaccine
against seasonal influenza. Moreover, rationing of vital
resources such as vaccines, antiviral drugs, and personal
protective equipment will be inevitable in the event of a
pandemic in virtually all populations, and especially so in
low-resource settings. We suggest that any potential ethical
dilemmas be addressed by a rationing process that is explicit,
is evidence-based, and has achieved community-wide con-
sensus.
There is a fundamental ethical difference between the
prioritization of vaccine for groups within which influenza
may be more transmissible due to intrinsic behavioural or
immunological factors (e.g., children) and prioritization for
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groups that are asked to deliberately put themselves in harm’s
way (e.g., front-line health care workers) [24,25]. Therefore,
countries with pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles may wish to
provide the most effective proven dose to health care workers
while optimizing a second dose so as to reduce the overall
attack rate. If the stockpile size is of the same order as the
amount of antigen required to provide the maximum dose to
health care workers (as is the case in the scenario we present
in Table 1), and if health care workers are equally susceptible
and infectious during a pandemic, then the overall efficacy of
the program will be substantially reduced. However, if health
care workers are more susceptible and infectious, then the
overall benefit of the minimum dose policy may be greater
than the values presented in Table 1. Quantifying this
community-level impact of the preferential maximum
strength vaccination of health care workers is challenging
for a number of reasons. Although some studies have been
conducted on the indirect benefits of vaccinating health care
workers who work primarily with the elderly [26], these
results cannot be used to derive reliable estimates of the
infectivity and susceptibility of health care workers in a
general setting. Further, during the main period of a
pandemic, when many people would be infected in the
community, a high proportion of those attending health care
facilities would already be infected. Therefore, the impact of
increased infectivity of health care workers may be of limited
importance. We suggest that further empirical and theoret-
ical studies are warranted in order that the likely impact of
different pre-pandemic vaccination policies on health care
workers and their community can be established.
Implicitly, we have assumed that the match would be good
between the vaccine strain and the pandemic strain. However,
it cannot be known in advance how close this match would
actually be. For example, low levels of cross-reactivity have
been observed between a newly emergent dominant strain of
HPAI in southern China and the strains used to formulate the
three vaccine candidates considered here (see Table 4 in [8]).
As might be expected, our predicted benefits are reduced as
thematch worsens (Figure S2). Although the dominance of this
new strain is probably due to high vaccine coverage of poultry
in some parts of China, which is not the case elsewhere, this
observation is still cause for concern. In particular, the
emergence of this strain emphasizes the likely need for the
constant updating of pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles, which
in practice would preclude a sufficiently large cumulative
stock over time with which to provide adequate coverage for
whole populations. This reinforces our argument that public
health authorities must optimize the population protection
derived from a limited antigen stockpile. We note that all
modelling and empirical studies of pre-pandemic vaccines are,
to some extent, conditional on a good match between target
strains and the pandemic strain. Therefore, at the outset of a
pandemic, when isolates of the circulating novel strain are
available, it may be appropriate to conduct dose- and strain-
specific immunogenicity trials as an integral part of the early
stages of a pre-pandemic vaccination program. If such trials
suggest that the vaccine is not going to be effective, it may be
appropriate to stop the vaccination program.
In the event of an influenza pandemic, it seems likely that
some countries will opt for transmission-limiting strategies
[11] in which children and young adults are prioritized. If this is
the case, we suggest that the stockpile (after provision for
front-line health care workers) be large enough to offer
vaccination at the lowest dose that gives an acceptable
individual level of protection to all members of priority age
groups. Different countries may choose different acceptable
individual levels of protection, depending on their ability to
manufacture or obtain antigen. If any country intends to offer
widespread pre-pandemic vaccination beyond younger age
groups, our results suggest that detailed transmission studies
should be conducted in order to be able to predict community-
level benefits, i.e., to reduce the degree of uncertainty in Figure
3. For example, if blood samples were taken frommembers of a
large number of households before and after the annual
influenza season and if the timing of symptoms were recorded,
modern serological and statistical techniques would permit
accurate estimates of the relative infectivity and susceptibility
of different age groups. More generally, choosing pandemic
vaccine doses and stockpile sizes using the approaches
described here will help to ensure that entire communities
receive optimal benefits from limited resources.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Every winter, millions of people catch influenza, a viral
infection of the nose, throat, and airways. Most recover quickly, but the
disease can be deadly. In the US, seasonal influenza outbreaks
(epidemics) cause 36,000 excess deaths annually. And now there are
fears that an avian (bird) influenza virus might trigger a human influenza
pandemic—a global epidemic that could kill millions. Seasonal
epidemics occur because flu viruses continually make small changes to
their hemagglutinin and neuraminidase molecules, the viral proteins
(antigens) that the immune system recognizes. Because of this
‘‘antigenic drift,’’ an immune system response (which can be induced
by catching flu or by vaccination with disabled circulating influenza
strains) that combats flu one year may provide only partial protection the
next year. ‘‘Antigenic shift’’ (large changes in flu antigens) can cause
pandemics because communities have no immunity to the changed
virus.
Why Was This Study Done? Although avian influenza virus, which
contains a hemagglutinin type that differs from currently circulating
human flu viruses, has caused a few cases of human influenza, it has not
started a human pandemic yet because it cannot move easily between
people. If it acquires this property, which will probably involve further
small antigenic changes, it could kill millions of people before scientists
can develop an effective vaccine against it. To provide some interim
protection, many countries are preparing stockpiles of ‘‘pre-pandemic’’
vaccines targeted against the avian virus. The US, for example, plans to
store enough pre-pandemic vaccine to provide maximum protection to
20 million people (including key health workers) out of its population of
300 million. But, given a limited stockpile of pre-pandemic vaccine,
might giving more people a lower dose of vaccine, which might reduce
the number of people susceptible to infection and induce herd immunity
by preventing efficient transmission of the flu virus, be a better way to
limit the spread of pandemic influenza? In this study, the researchers
have used mathematical modeling to investigate this question.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? To predict the infection rates
associated with different vaccination policies, the researchers developed
a mathematical model that incorporates data on human immune
responses induced with three experimental vaccines against the avian
virus and historical data on the person–person transmission of previous
pandemic influenza viruses. For all the vaccines, the model predicts that
giving more people a low dose of the vaccine would limit the spread of
influenza better than giving fewer people the high dose needed for full
individual protection. For example, the researchers estimate that dividing
the planned US stockpile of one experimental vaccine equally between
160 million people instead of giving it at the fully protective dose to 20
million people might avert about 27 million influenza cases in less than
year. However, giving the maximally protective dose to the 9 million US
health-care workers and using the remaining vaccine at a lower dose to
optimize protection within the general population might avert only 14
million infections.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest that, given a
limited stockpile of pre-pandemic vaccine, increasing the population
coverage of vaccination by using low doses of vaccine might reduce the
overall influenza infection rate more effectively than vaccinating fewer
people with fully protective doses of vaccine. However, because the
researchers’ model includes many assumptions, it can only give an
indication of how different strategies might perform, not firm numbers
for how many influenza cases each strategy is likely to avert. Before
public-health officials use this or a similar model to help them decide the
best way to use pre-pandemic vaccines to control a human influenza
pandemic, they will need more information about the efficacy of these
vaccines and about transmission rates of currently circulating viruses.
They will also need to know whether pre-pandemic vaccines actually
provide good protection against the pandemic virus, as assumed in this
study, before they can recommend mass immunization with low doses of
pre-pandemic vaccine, selective vaccination with high doses, or a mixed
strategy.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0040218.
 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide information on
influenza and influenza vaccination for patients and health
professionals (in English, Spanish, Filipino, Chinese, and Vietnamese)
 The World Health Organization has a fact sheet on influenza and on
the global response to avian influenza (in English, Spanish, French,
Russian, Arabic, and Chinese)
 The MedlinePlus online encyclopedia devotes a page to flu (in English
and Spanish)
 The UK Health Protection Agency information on avian, pandemic, and
seasonal influenza
 The US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has a
comprehensive feature called ‘‘focus on the flu’’
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